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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

J, W. BROADWATER,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
GLEN VAN TASSEL, ERMA VAN TASSELL,
his wife, and DICK VAN TASSELL,
Defendants and Appellants.
GLEN VAN TASSELL, and ERMA VAN
TASSELL, his wife,

Case No.

15319

Third Party Plaintiffs,

vs.
J. W. BROADWATER and JANE DOE

BROADWATER, his wife I and ANDREW
R. BIRRELL, JR., and PATRICIA J.
BIRRELL, his wife, and JOSEPH H.
SHOOL and JANE DOE SHOOL, his
wife,
Third Party Defendants.
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S REPLY
TO VAN TASSELL'S BRIEF ON RE-HEARING
Appeal from the Judgment of the Second Judicial District
Court for Davis County, Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, District Judge
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~~torneys for Appellants

~:i~ East
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Allen H. Tibbals
Michael Z. Hayes
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Attorneys for Respondent
400 Chancellor Building
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

:. :1.

BROADWATER,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

.. s.
:LE:·; '!AN TASSELL, ERMA
·:.:Cl TASSELL, his wife,
a~ci

i:JICK VAN TASSELL,

Defendants and
Appellants.

:w1 VAN TASSELL and
c?:~

VA.\J TASSELL,

his wife,

Third Party
Plaintiffs,

Case No.

15319

'!S,

J. W. BROADWATER and
:,i.~E DOE BROADWATER

',is wife, and ANDREW
3IPRELL' JR. ' and
?.;TRICL~ J. BIRRELL,
~ 15 ·.v1fe, and JOSEPH
"· SHOOL and JANE DOE
SHOOL, his wife,
Third Party
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S REPLY
TO VAN TASSELL'S BRIEF ON RE-HEARING

AUTHORITY FOR FILING OF REPLY

Rules of Civil Procedure do not cover specifically
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the procedures in the Supreme Court once a re-hearing has bes:,
granted by the Court, counsel for both the Appellant and Res~c:_
requested advice on procedure from the Court.

The procedure . :;

verbally agreed upon with Chief Justice Ellett.

The attorne1. '.:

Van Tassell was granted until the 3rd of July within which to
file his brief in reply to the brief of Broadwater on the pe:!:_
for re-hearing.

It was agreed further that the Respondent

Broadwater would have until the date of oral argument, which·.::,
scheduled to be July 17th at 9:00 a.m., in which to presentc:
the Supreme Court any reply which the Respondent Broadwater
might deem necessary to the brief of Van Tassell.

This

r~t

accordingly submitted.
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
Throughout this reply, J. W. Broadwater will be des ..
herein by name or as Respondent.

The Van Tassells will be re:,_

to herein by name or as Appellants.
REASON FOR REPLY TO APPELLANT'S
BRIEF ON RE-HEARING
Examination of the brief submitted by counsel for

Mr. Van Tassell, the Appellant, disclosed a number

0

f i nacc~:~::·

and assumptions which cannot be substantiated in the record.
may well be that this stems from the fact that Craig Ste;:he.:
Cook, present counsel, did not participate in the proceeciin::

-2-
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;;

,: any tirre before the lower court.

Mr. Cook's first appearance

_ :his matter was in connection with the filing of the Reply
:::e::.

For the purpose of clarification and limitation of the

::oo~em

before the Court, Petitioner-Respondent submits this

ARGUMENT
Point I
THE APPELLANT CONCEDES RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND SEEKS AVOIDANCE SOLELY ON TECHNICALITIES, WHICH
APE IMPROPERLY RAISED BEFORE THIS COURT.
NO CLAIM IS
~~i\DE THAT THE ATTORNEY'S FEES ARE NOT REASONABLE.
The inherent weakness of the position taken by Appellant
:s ::ade manifest by the statement appearing on Page 9 of Van
:~ssell'

s Brief on the Pe ti ti on for Re-Hearing:

"In this case, however, there was no dispute that
shoulrl Broadwater prevail in the action, a reasonable
~ttorney' s fee was legally required."
Throughout the Brief filed by Appellant, no attack was

~e·:ied upon the reasonableness of the fees awarded by the District
1

·iherein then does any complaint lie over the fees awarded

:;· tne District Court?

The concession that it was a legal re-

:.:remen t that the fee be awarded makes academic the discussion,
·1:n1cn the .,

11

::e:er;ninat1on

or

Rppe

ant now seeks to force upon this Court.
the fee,

The

if legally required, in such cases has

either based upon a percentage of the amount of
: .. ,

:'orec~osure as was recognized in the Bar Fee Schedule in

1959,
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approved by the Third Judicial District Court as follows:
"The following schedule of attorney's fees has b .
adopted by the Third Judicial District Court as of ee"
December 1, 1959, in default cases presented without
proof as to the reasonableness of attorney's fees~
11
actions for the collection of money .
11

(Notes, Mortgages and Contracts That Are Supported
By a Mortgage or Lien.)

The first
The next
The next
The next
The next
Above

100.
400.
500.
1,000.
18,000.
20,000 no
$

50%
$ 50.00
33 1/3% 133.00
25%
125.00
15%
150.00
10%
1,800.00
fee is set

$

100.
500.
1, 000.
2,000.
20,000.

50. Ou
183' ]]
308' ]]
458.80
2 '258' ]]

NOTE:
It is recognized that a fee in foreclosures
of Mortgages may be on a noncontingent or guarantee
fee basis, and the usual factors of amount and time
involved, and complexities, etc. , may be considered
in determining a reasonable fee.
Minimum Fee for Foreclosure of Mortgage on Real
Property . . . . . . $500.00. 11
or, i t has been based upon the Court's own review of the procees:
taking place before it with such additional testimony or evidenc,
as the Court might require to facilitate its determination of::.
fee.

The assumption made by the Appellant that counsel for

Broadwater erred in not having set forth specific testimony or.
the amount of the attorney's fees cannot be justified.

It is t:

that in the portion of the record of this case, which has been
presented to the Supreme Court, no specific Stipulation regarcc:
attorney's fees by counsel for Van Tassell appears.

can it i:e

said that simply because this item does not appear in the reccr:

-4-
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cresented that such a stipulation or concession was not made?
:.;e think not.

The conduct of the Court and of counsel clearly

reflects that the Court was satisfied of its capacity to pass
'Jpon the attorney's fees and did so.

Whether this capacity was

conceded expressly by counsel for Van Tassell or whether it arose
solely from the fact that the proceedings all took place before
the court, that the Court record was replete with the work
»;hich had been done by counsel, and, therefore, under the doctrine
e~unciated

by this Court in the Blair case, Blair Enterprise v.

:1, B. Supertire, 28U 2d 192, 499 P2d 1294, it bacame unnecessary

to introduce further evidence on this matter should not be a
basis for determination of the rightof Mr. Broadwater to recover

attorney's fees.

It must be remembered that the original pleadings,

in the Complaint set forth over the signature of plaintiff's
counsel, plaintiff's statement of what constituted a reasonable
attorney's fee.

This was traversed in the form of a general denial •

.it the informal conference in the judges chambers immediately before

tile trial, between counsel and the Judge as to the issues upon which
evidence would have to be presented, no requirement was made by the
Court or by counsel for Mr. van Tassell that any testimony would
be required on attorney's fees.

As more fully stated in Petitioner's

-5-
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Brief in Support of the Petition for Re-Hearing, counsel for Va:.
Tassell raised no objection to the elimination of attorney's

f~s

from the designation of issues upon which testimony had to be tv
or evidence presented at trial.

The conduct of counsel and of

the Court is consistent with the recognition by all parties of
the power and capacity of the Court to determine this issue
without additional testimony.

It is significant that counsel ic:

Van Tassell in his reply to the petition attempts to

disting~~

the Blair Enterprise case from the instant matter by contendinq
that:
"In the Blair Enterprise case it is apparent that
none of the adverse parties objected to the reasonableness of the attorney's fees at any stage in the
appellate proceedings and that this Court, therefore,
ruled that such objection had been waived."
(Van Tassell 's
Brief on Re-Hearing, Page 8)
Examination of the Brief filed in the Supreme Court o'.
the State of Utah by the Appellant in the Blair case reflects

Ui

Point II of the Brief was:
"The trial court erred in granting sammarily the
defendant's claim for attorney's fees without eliciting
testimony thereon."
In support of this point, counsel there stated at Page 11 of iU
Brief filed in the Supreme Court:
"In the present case, there was no evidence introduced pertaining to the reasonableness of the attorney's
fees claimed."
Manifestly, therefore, the statement of counsel for
Van Tassell that none of the parties had objected at any st~e-
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:'ie appellate proceedings is not correct.

In the record on appeal

:r. that case, no testimony was contained or set forth in support
;'.the attorney's fees.

The recital in the Findings of Fact that:

"Testimony having been presented to the Court that
a reasonable attorney's fee, which accrued from enforcing
chis agreement or in pursuing the remedy afforded to the
defendant, Alvin I. Smith, is the sum of $1,500.00."
surplusage.

15

The Court was not required to make any findings that

:estimony had been offered.

The key part of the finding, which

·.ias sustained by this Court was exactly the same as the key finding
:~

the instant case:
"The Court further finds that the sum of $1,500.00
is a reasonable attorney's fee."
In the instant case, the Court, in Findings 7, 10, 13, 18,

22 and 25, specifically found that by the express terms of the Note

and Mortgage, a reasonable attorney's fee was to be allowed and
then found that a reasonable attorney's fee was in the amount set
'.orth in each of these Findings.

(See Petitioner's Brief in Support

of Plaintiff-Respondent's Petition for Re-Hearing, Pages 7 and 8,
record 380 through 384).
We believe that the action taken by the District Court
:r: this case supports the same treatment as that afforded in the

~ir Enterprise v.
?

2

d 1294.

M.

B. Supertire case, 28 Utah 2d

194; 499

We direct the Court's attention to the statement made

:~· ~he Supreme Court in the Blair case:
"The real estate purchase contract provides that the
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defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses includ ,
The trial court awarded thlr.
a reasonable attorney's fee.
Respondent Alvin I. Smith judgment against the plaintif/
for the sum of $1,500.00 as attorney's fees accrued from
enforcing the contract.
This Court has held unless the
parties agree otherwise, the Court is obliged to take
evidence on the is~ue. of reasonableness of the attorney's
fees and to make findings thereon . . . The trial court
made findings thereon based on evidence adduced, as statec
in the judgment, and although the record fails to disclose
the evidence, no objection was levelled against them, so
we accept them as true taken under familiar rules of
review."
(Emphasis added)
So in this case, the trial court made findings based::
the evidence adduced at the trial and they should be accepted as under the familiar rules of review.
Point II
THE COURT HAS THE INHERENT POWER AND CAPACITY WHERE THE
PROCEEDINGS TAKE PLACE BEFORE IT TO DETERMINE AND ALLOW
A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE BASED ON THE RECORD.
The Court's attention is directed to an annotation
appearing in 18 ALR 3d at Page 733 on the subject:
"NECESSITY OF INTRODUCING EVIDENCE TO SHOlv
REASONABLENESS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WHERE PROMISSORY NOTE
PROVIDES FOR SUCH FEES .
The editor's comments in this annotation at Page 735 we believe
worthy of note:
"There seems to be no doubt that a court may take
evidence relative to the reasonable value of attorney's
fees in relation to a promissory note, 1. 5 nor could it
be seriously argued that a plaintiff may not present
evidence to support his claim as to the reasonableness
of the attorney's fee;2 but the question here under
~.,,,
discussion is whether it is necessary to introduce ~
of such value.
Two related, but not entirely identical problems
come within the ambit of this annotation.
The first is

-8-
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whether it is necessary to introduce evidence to show
the reasonableness of an attorney's fee claimed in an
action on a promissory note where the note provides for
the payment of a reasonable attorney's fee or provides
for the payment of an attorney's fee without specifying
the amount thereof in any manner.
Since the note in such
a case specifically leaves open the question of what amount
of attorney's fee is recoverable, this is generally held
to be a fact question which can be determined only after
the introduction of evidence to support the claim for
a fee. 3 There are, however, a number of jurisdictions
which hold that the trial judge, by the nature of his
position and experience, is best qualified to determine
what constitutes a reasonable fee, and therefore need not
admit, and is not bound by if he does admit, evidence
of the reasonableness of such fees. 4"
(Emphasis added)
In support of footnote 4, the annotation cites cases for
~he

proposition that where a promissory note provides for payment

cf reasonable fee or provides for the payment of an attorney's
'.ee without specifying the amount thereof in any manner, the trial
court may decide what constitutes a reasonable fee without any
:esort to evidence.

Such decisions are generally based on the

'.oict that the trial judge, in view of his experience on the bench
a~.d at the bar is best qualified to make the determination of

:easonableness.

The annotating authority cites in support of

this proposition the case of Pitcher v. Balts, 242 Arkansas 625

~~ 4 Southwestern 2d 8 5 9 and the cases of Baker v. Eiler' s Music,
175

California 652 166 Pacific 1006, Mann v. Mann. 76 California

·°'Pfellate 2d 32 172 Pacific 2d 369, Marsh Wall Products, Inc. v.
:Je--·· ·1

~~ilding Specialities,

328 Pacific 2d 259.

162 California Appellate 2d

The California cases particularly point

~: at where the note provides for the payment of a reasonable
1
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attorney's fee to be fixed by the Court or similar language sue'.
as a reasonable attorney's fee if suit is commenced to enforce
payment, etc.

The trial court is thereupon vested with the auf:.

to determine the fee in its discretion and without the introduction of any direct evidence upon the matter and that such a
determination will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.
A number of other cases are cited including one in the State

0:

Washinqton, Bird v. Shoning, 138 Washington 187 244 Pacific 331
in support of this general proposition.

We believe the princi?i.

enunciated in this annotation is supported by the case of Ander::
Anderson, 54 Utah 309, 181 Pacific 168 where the Supreme Court
said:
"We respectfully submit that had testimony of one
of the attorneys for the Petitioner-Respondent taken the
stand in the lower court and testified as to attorney's
fees, this Court on appeal would have held that the
lower court was not bound to accept that testimony and
could have found otherwise based upon the record before
it. II
Under such circumstances, why does not the trial cour:
have jurisdiction to determine the attorney's fees initially,
without the testimony of the attorney, particularly when the
plaintiff's point of view as to the reasonableness of attornev's
fees is already expressed in the Complaint duly signed by cc·Jr.se.
To require testimony before fees can be allowed and the!'l concecs
that the Court can ignore the testimony and determine the fees

-10-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

::on: tne record creates an anomoly.

We submit that where, as

::e:e, the case was tried to the Court, the motions and other
03

tters were before the Court, testimony should only be required

: : the court requests i t as an aid to the Court in determining
::,e attorney's fees to be allowed.

Point III

THE APPELLANT'S BRIEF DID NOT CONFOR.~ TO THE RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND CORRECTLY RAISE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
THE ISSUE OF SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND THE MATTER WAS NEVER PROPERLY
BEFORE THIS COURT.
In the Argument contained in Point II of Van Tassell's
3:ief on Re-Hearing commencing at Page 10 of said document, an
2:fort is made to justify the failure of Mr. Fullmer as counsel
'.or the Appellant to comply with the provisions of 75 P (2),
:~tah

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Counsel contends that the language

::'the Appellant's Brief, wherein it was stated:
"The Court's decision at trial was not supported
by the evidence presented

·.. as a sufficient notice to the Court and to all concerned of the
:.:ntention subsequently raised before the Supreme Court for the
:'irst time in the Reply Brief that there was not evidence to
S'J?P'Jrt the award of attorney's fees.

The language did not

In his motion for new trial,

·::. :·-L 0 er, attorney for van Tassell stated that the motion was
:ocsc;:j '.i~sn ?ule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, subparagraphs

-11-
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4, 6 and 7.

Paragraph 6 under Rule 59 is:

"Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdic:
or other decision, or that i t is against the law."
The argument on the new trial and the subsequent

a~:":

to the Supreme Court made no mention whatever of attorney's :ees.
Neither this Court nor the lower court was at any time put on :.::.
of the contention made by the Appellant.
Mr. Cook, author of the Reply to Petitioner's Brief c:
Re-Hearing, has no

difficulty in finding that the failure to

have any person take the stand and testify at the trial as to

·.>:.o·

he considered to be a reasonable attorney's fee was fatal to tr.e
award of attorney's fees by the lower court.

Coo~

However, Mr.

excuses Mr. Fullmer and does not suggest that any sanctions sr,2::.
be imposed by the Court because Mr. Fullmer as counsel for Van
Tassell failed in the court below or in his Brief on appeal to
raise the case of insufficiency of the evidence to substa.01tia:e
the attorney's fees.

It must be remembered that Mr. Cook, in a

Reply Brief filed in violation of the Supreme Court rules, :or
the first time raises the issue on attorney's fees.

It wouldsii·

that in Mr. Cook's view, Mr. Fullmer' s error, if in fact it was
an error, in raising the issue of attorney's fees is excusable.
The error of counsel for the Respondent in failing to offer
testimony on the issue of attorney's fees cannot be excused. ,;,
submit this is manifestly unfair, inequitable and unjust

1

nc ::

pursued results in the loss of ar important and valuable contrc.c:
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'.~c:'.t

:-ield by Mr. Broadwater, the Respondent, for no substantiative
In no other area than attorney's fees would a technical

~=:'iciency

such as that claimed to have occured would be allowed

:c deprive a litigant of a valuable legal right.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant Van Tassell, having conceded the legal
~ecessity

for awarding attorney's fees to Respondent Broadwater

o.:;d never having raised any question with regard to the reasonableness of the fee allowed, deals in semantics when he relies on an
3~9arent

omission in the record to deprive the Respondent of this

·.::;luable con tract right.

Clearly, the original counsel who participated

in t:ie trial had no thought that the Court had erred in awarding
attorney's fees or the amount that was awarded.

It ill becomes

a stranger to the proceedings to attempt to question the action of
:he lower court, acquiesed in by the counsel that tried the action
a:li prosecuted the appeal.

This Court should give greater sanctity

to the proceedings in the lower court than to perrni t
33

here levied.

such an attack

The award of attorney's fees should be affirmed

a:id the Respondent should be granted costs on appeal.

DATED this

/3fl1 day of July,

1978.

Respectfully Submitted,
TIBBALS AND STATEN
Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent
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